'During the last days, up to January 1, when we were informed that a proposal for surrender had been sent to the enemy, things were in much the same state, especially with regard to munitions of war. If we look at the figures, we find that there were, counting the naval reserves, as many as 180,000 shells. Of these there were about 1,000 rounds of 9-inch, bigger calibre, and howitzer; 6,800 rounds of 6-inch and forty-two line. Of light and 57-millimetre coast quick-firing (put ashore) there were 1,800. Of 57-millimetre, about 2,000. Of 75, 57, 47, and 37 millimetre (for the naval guns mounted on the batteries) there were about 150,000. For 3-inch quick-firing field artillery, about 4,000. In round numbers, not counting the 3-inch quick-firing field-guns, there were about 14,000 rounds of shrapnel and 10,000 rounds of common. 'Although the guns were less in number and worse in condition than they had been, yet they were quite serviceable. The casting of shell for 6-inch and 42-line guns, the preparation of fuses, of pyroxyline shells, and the fusing of shell, were in full swing; we were turning out 100 shells a day, and hoped to do more. 'I consider generally that the tales in the papers about the deficiency of shrapnel, the unserviceability of the shells and guns, of the lack of fuses, etc., are exaggerations, told on purpose to put things in a light to justify the defence being cut short. The question of surrender was one for the decision of the highest authorities, but I imagine they did not lack for irrelevant and incorrect reports. The papers can, of course, say what they like, but at a formal investigation official reports and more responsible and competent evidence will, it is hoped, be taken, and not that of those who allow themselves to be interviewed.... 'To get at the true position of affairs as regards the artillery in Port Arthur, it is not sufficient to look merely at figures; it is necessary to understand them. In this respect General Reuss is quite at sea, and it would have been better if he had not meddled with that of which he knows nothing and understands less. It is true that the want of powder, quick-firing fuses, and range-finders was felt; that naval shells were spoilt and had to be remade; that naval common shell burst badly, etc.; but steps were taken to cope with all this, and the artillery service did splendid work....' Garrison. As regards the garrison of the Fortress, General Smirnoff, its Commandant, gives the following details: 'The strength of our troops on the day of the surrender was as follows: 'On the defences of the Fortress: 'Bayonets (infantry and sailors) 12,500 'Artillery 5,000 'Engineers 500 'Non-combatants in army 1,000 ------ 'Total 19,000'