During the gradual development of the military situation in the district--when the most prominent features had been the extraordinary errors on the part of General Fock--General Stössel was acting the dictator in Arthur, where, in addition to his main task of interfering at every step with the useful work of General Smirnoff, he lost no opportunity of sowing dissension between the fleet and the army, especially after the squadron's unlucky sortie. Everywhere on shore--in the streets, in the restaurants--there was nothing but abuse and curses for the naval officers, from highest to lowest. Every one accused the sailors of not wishing to put to sea. One result of this was the production of a scurrilous allegory by two anonymous authors. The first described a dream, which he pretended to have had, and in which the enemy, in the shape of a bull, was eventually killed by Russian soldiers. The second narrated another dream, a sequel to the first, in which the navy were represented as hares which bolted and left the soldiers to fight the enemy alone. I happened to read this effusion when I was on board one of the ships, for some one had had it lithographed, and sent a copy to each of the ward-rooms in the fleet, including a copy to Admiral Witgeft. This kind act naturally did not tend to smooth matters between the services. Though the sailors endeavoured to ignore it, at heart they felt the undeserved insult deeply. CHAPTER XIX FORTIFYING OUR LINE The 4th of July showed the Japanese the power and energy of our troops. It illustrated their capabilities not only in defence, but of successfully delivering an attack; for it should be noted that the minimum number of troops on the advanced positions took part in the engagement of that day. Having retaken Big Ridge, Green Hills, and the foot hills of Kuen-san, still holding the defile--the second key to the advanced positions--and having made some progress with the fortifying of all the defensive line, we completely stopped the enemy's forward movement towards the outer forts, on which work was now being pressed on. At this time our mobile shore defences (a division of gunboats) were able to shell the enemy's positions, his rear communications, and his bivouacs, with great success. Thanks to the result of the battle of the 4th, the enemy felt that they were liable to attack themselves; the desperate and well-planned attack of our right flank, under the command of General Kondratenko, on that day had come as a nasty surprise. After Kinchou they had advanced victoriously--as they liked. The battle of June 26, with our abandonment of Kuen-san, confirmed them in the belief that Russians were incapable of taking advantage of and of holding good positions; but the actions of July 3 and 4 made them more careful, and not quite so ready to believe blindly in their lucky star. They now assumed the defensive, and began to construct field fortifications,