(_C._) THE ATONEMENT. We pass on now to the doctrine of the Atonement, which is that Christ's death was in some sense a sacrifice for sin, and thus reconciled (or made 'at-one') God the Father and sinful man. And though not actually stated in the Creeds, it is implied in the words, _Was crucified also for us_, and _Who suffered for our salvation_. The chief difficulty is of course on moral grounds. The idea of atonement, it is said, or of one man being made to suffer as a substitute for another, and thus appeasing the Deity, was well-nigh universal in early times, and is so still among savage nations. Such a sacrifice, however, is a great injustice to the _victim_; it ascribes an unworthy character to God, as a _Judge_, Who can be satisfied with the punishment of an innocent man in place of the guilty one; and it has a bad influence on the _sinner_, allowing him to sin on with impunity, provided he can find another substitute when needed. The answer to this difficulty is, that it takes no account of the most important part of the Christian doctrine, which is the _willingness_ of the Victim. According to Christianity, Christ was a willing Sacrifice, Who freely laid down His life;[178] while the human sacrifices just alluded to were not willing sacrifices, since the victims had no option in the matter. And, as we shall see, this alters the case completely both in regard to the victim himself, the judge, and the sinner. [Footnote 178: _E.g._, John 10. 18.] (1.) _As to the Victim._ It is plain that his willingness does away with the injustice altogether. There is no injustice in accepting a volunteer for any painful office, provided he thoroughly knows what he is doing, for he need not undertake it unless he likes. If, on the other hand, we deny the voluntary and sacrificial character of Christ's death, and regard Him as merely a good man, then there certainly was injustice--and very great injustice too, that such a noble life should have ended in such a shameful death. (2.) _As to the Judge._ Next as to the Judge. It will be seen that a willing sacrifice, though it does not satisfy his _justice_, makes a strong appeal to his _mercy_; at least it would do so in human cases. Suppose for instance a judge had before him a criminal who well deserved to be punished, but a good man, perhaps the judge's own son, came forward, and not only interceded for the prisoner, but was so devotedly attached to him as to offer to bear his punishment (pay his fine, for instance), this would certainly influence the judge in his favour. It would show that he was not so hopelessly bad after all. Mercy and justice are thus both facts of human nature; and it is also a fact of human nature, that the voluntary suffering, or willingness to suffer, of a good man for a criminal whom he deeply loves, does incline man to mercy rather than justice.