“Public opinion in Great Britain would unanimously side with France in her operations in Asia Minor, provided France declares herself willing to accept our co-operation. “We easily understand that the occupation of Constantinople came rather as a surprise to France and Italy, especially if we take into account that this action closely followed another measure of a similar kind taken by England within the last fortnight. “It seems that this time our Allies have assumed a slightly different attitude: official France is still hesitating; public opinion has changed completely, and the pro-Turkish feeling is on the wane. If France wants to maintain her prestige in the East unimpaired, she must associate with any political, naval, or military measure taken by England. “The Italian standpoint and interests do not differ much from ours, or from those of France, but Italian circles plainly advocate a policy of non-intervention, or an intervention restricted to a diplomatic action.” If such proceedings emanating from some American or English circles were hardly a matter of surprise, the attitude of some Frenchmen of note was not so easily accounted for. M. Hanotaux[23] was led by a strange political aberration and a curious oblivion of all the traditional policy of France—unless he deliberately meant to break off with it, or was blinded by prejudice—when he assigned Constantinople to Greece, because, according to him, to give Constantinople to Greece was “to give it to Europe, and to her worthiest, noblest offspring.”