Unfortunately, French policy resorted again to the same manœuvre to which it was indebted for its failure on the Baltic coast, and which repeatedly deferred a solution of the Russian question. For the Allies refused to settle the condition of the Baltic States definitely, and even tried to restore Russia to its former state; they even urged the Baltic States, till Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak had been defeated, to carry on the onerous struggle they had undertaken and to make all sacrifices of men and money to capture Petrograd, which they were not eager to do, as they would have merely paved the way to the coming of the Pan-Russian generals. The Allies made a similar mistake when they indirectly asked the mountaineers of Caucasus, who wanted to be independent, to attack the Bolshevists, but gave them no guarantee they would recognise their independence. Of course, the mountaineers refused to play such a part, for they risked finding themselves confronted one day or another with a Russia that would despise their national aspirations and would oppress them. The situation could have been saved and the balance between the States on the confines of the Russian Empire could have been restored only by a close understanding of all the Caucasian peoples, after their independence should have been recognised; the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaïjan agreed on this point with the representatives of Northern Caucasus, and these peoples were ready to help each other mutually. In the course of the last sitting of the Supreme Council to which the delegates of Georgia and Azerbaïjan had been invited, the latter declared “that the mountaineers were brave, that they had constituted some of the best units of the former Russian army, and were bent upon stopping the Bolshevists, but they lacked arms and ammunition.” Under such circumstances it seemed the Allies could not possibly ignore these peoples’ determination and turn a deaf ear to their earnest request, yet they took no decision. With regard to the Moslem question this attitude of the Conference, which seemed bent upon ignoring Northern Caucasus, was equally strange, for it was bound to bring about discontent among these Moslem populations. It was the more unaccountable as the Bolshevists, who set up as protectors of these populations, had sent many emissaries among them, who could not but derive profit from the Allies’ attitude. The Bolshevists had, of course, immediately recognised Daghestan a Moslem State.