“In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St. Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November 21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople, was a veritable _idée fixe_. The other Ministers refrained from expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor Alexander III left Russia. “The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and also to the Minister of the Navy.” M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director.