Iran -- History -- To 640; Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821; Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia; Xenophon, 426 B.C.-355 B.C.
obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of success. But
none of his colleagues in command would have been able to accomplish the
like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure
obedience for any simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable,
that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the other generals would have
followed the passionate movement, even though they had been
reluctant--from simple inability to repress it. Again--whatever might
have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain that even _he_
would not have been able to work upon the minds of these excited
soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as well as
soldiers,--bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed to Hellenic order,
with authority operating in part through voice and persuasion, and not
through the Persian whip and instruments of torture. The memorable
discourse on the Thrakion at Byzantium illustrates the working of that
persuasive agency which formed one of the permanent forces and
conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could
sometimes accuse innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed
assemblies--a part of the case which historians of Greece often present
as if it were the whole--he could also, and that in the most trying
emergencies, combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring
into vivid presence the half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason
and duty.
§ 19. The army finally leaves Byzantium; Seuthês offers to hire them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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