=1, 2, and 3; Actuality, Intrinsic Nature and Intelligence of Subconscious Processes.=—As to the first question, whether subconscious processes can be established in principle as a sound induction from experimental and clinical facts and not merely as a hypothetical concept, I have already pointed out that many manifestations of conservation already cited in the exposition of the theory of memory are of equal evidential value for the _actuality_ of such processes. Let us now consider them in more detail from the point of view, more particularly, of the second and third questions—the _intrinsic nature_ (whether coconscious or unconscious) and _intelligence_ of the underlying processes at work. In any given case however the actuality of the subconscious process must always be first demonstrated. If we leave aside those conditions (hysteria, coconscious personalities) wherein specific memory of a coconscious process can be recovered, or such a process can be directly communicated with (automatic writing and speech), the conditions required for the valid postulation of a subconscious process underlying any given phenomenon are: first, that the causal factor shall be positively _known_; second, that it shall be an antecedent experience; and, third, that it shall not be in the content of consciousness at the moment of the occurrence of the phenomenon. If the causal factor and the phenomenon are both known, then the only unknown factor to be determined is the process, if any, _intervening between the two_. If this is not in consciousness, a subconscious process must be postulated. Obviously, if the known causal factor is _immediately_ related to the caused phenomenon, the subconscious process must be the causal factor itself. But if the known causal factor is _not immediately_ related to the caused phenomenon, there must be an intervening process which must be subconscious, perhaps consisting of a succession of processes eventuating in the final phenomenon. For instance, if the causal factor is a hypnotic suggestion (for which there is afterwards amnesia) that the subject when awake shall automatically raise the right arm, a subconscious process which is the memory of that suggestion immediately provokes the automatic phenomenon. If, however, the suggestion is that of a series of automatic actions involving complicated behavior, or if it is a mathematical calculation, the intervening process which provokes the end result must not only be subconscious but must be a more or less complicated succession of processes.