The unconscious : $b The fundamentals of human personality, normal and abnormalPrince, Morton
Science
The unconscious : $b The fundamentals of human personality, normal and abnormal
Prince, Morton
Psychology, Pathological; Subconsciousness
M. Foster: A Text Book of Physiology, 1895, page 726.
Footnote 125:
Von M. Rothmann: Demonstration des Hundes ohne Grossirn. _Bericht über
den V Kongress f. Experiment. Psychol. in Berlin, 1912_, page 256. The
report is too meager to admit of independent judgment of the animal’s
behavior in many of its details.
Footnote 126:
Until the basal ganglia have been microscopically examined it cannot
be determined that the loss of function was not due to secondary
organic lesions. In Goltz’ dog, which acted like a blind dog, one
optic nerve was cut and the corpora striata and optic thalami were
partly involved in the lesion.
Footnote 127:
Quoted from Schräder by Loeb.
Footnote 128:
Cf. Lloyd Morgan: Instinct and Experience, 1912.
Footnote 129:
Dr. Morgan in his work, “Instinct and Experience,” 1912, published
before Rothmann’s observations, remarks that this “is not inherently
improbable” although it had not as yet been demonstrated.
Footnote 130:
From the point of view here adopted, the recent discussions and
controversies over the problems of “instinct and intelligence” have
been much muddled by the arbitrary denial of conscious elements to an
instinctive process, and by the acceptation of consciousness or
conscious experience as the criterion of intelligence. In this view
instinct and intelligence become contrasted concepts which to my way
of thinking they are not necessarily at all. If it is admitted that
instinct is an innate disposition, its contrasted quality is that
which is _acquired_ and not the quality of consciousness. It is true
that acquired behavior is commonly if not always determined by
conscious processes (conscious experience), but likewise innate
behavior may be determined by processes which contain conscious
elements. Surely fear is instinctive and is a conscious element in an
innate process; and so must be visual and other sensory images, as in
the first peck of a chicken. To look upon the first visual image
simply as conscious “experience,” as an “onlooker,” and reject it as a
factor in the process which determines that first peck, seems to me to
be arbitrary psychology if not physiology. If consciousness may be a
quality of an innate process—and why not?—it cannot be a criterion of
intelligence. The true converse of the conscious is the unconscious.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account