This formulation, by McDougall, of emotion as one factor in an instinctive process must be regarded as one of the most important contributions to our knowledge of the mechanism of emotion. It can scarcely be traversed, as it is little more than a descriptive statement of observed facts. It is strange that this conception of the process should have been so long overlooked. Its value lies in replacing vagueness with a precise conception of one of the most important of psychological phenomena, and enables us to clearly understand the part played by emotion in mental processes. It also shows clearly the inadequacy of the objective methods of normal psychology when attempting to investigate emotion by measuring the discharge of its impulsive force in one direction only, namely, the disturbances of the functions of the viscera (vasomotor, glandular, etc.). It discharges also along lines of mental activity and conduct. When studying the organization of complexes, and in other lectures, we saw, as everyone knows in a general way, that _affects may become linked with ideas_, and that the force derived from this association gives to the ideas intensity and conative influence. Further, it was developed that the linking of a strong affect tends to stronger registration and conservation of experiences. This linking of an affect to an idea is one of the foundation stones of the pathology of the psycho-neuroses. One might say that upon it “hangs all the law and the prophets.” Inasmuch as a sentiment, even in the connotations of popular language, besides being an idea always involves an affective element, it is obvious that _a sentiment is an idea of an object with which one or more emotions are organized_. But, obvious as it is, it remained for Mr. Shand, as McDougall reminds us, to make this precise definition. It is hardly a discovery as the latter puts it, as the facts themselves have been long known; but it is a valuable definition and its value lies in helping us to think clearly. Nearly every idea, if not every idea, has an affective tone of some kind, or is one of a complex of ideas endowed with such tone. This tone may be weak so as to be hardly recognizable, or it may be strong. Now, if emotion is one factor in an instinctive process, it is evident that a sentiment more precisely is an idea of an object linked or organized with one or more “emotion-instincts.” As McDougall has precisely phrased it, “A sentiment is an organized system of emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object.” The impulsive force of the emotional dispositions or linked instincts becomes the conative force of the idea, and it is this factor which carries the idea to fruition. This is one of the most important principles of functional psychology. Its value can scarcely be exaggerated. Without the impulse of a linked emotion ideas would be lifeless, dead, inert, incapable of determining conduct. But when we say