The question of arrest without warrant emerged later in several other cases; for example, Johnson vs. Tompkins (1833),[757] the matter of Peter, _alias_ Lewis Martin (1837),[758] Prigg _vs._ Pennsylvania (1842),[759] and State _vs._ Hoppess (1845).[760] The line of objection followed by those opposing the law in this series will be sufficiently indicated by the arguments presented in the Massachusetts case of 1823, treated above. The tribunals before which the later suits were brought did not depart from the precedent set in the early case, and the act of 1793 was invariably justified. In Johnson _vs._ Tompkins the court pointed out that under the law the claimant was not only free to arrest his fugitive without a warrant, but that he was also free to do this unaccompanied by any civil officer, although, as was suggested, it was the part of prudence to have such an officer to keep the peace.[761] In the famous case of Prigg _vs._ Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of the United States went back of the law of Congress to the Constitution in seeking the source of the master's right of recaption, and laid down the principle that "under and in virtue of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace, or any illegal violence. In this sense and to this extent this clause of the Constitution may properly be said to execute itself, and to require no aid from legislation, state or national."[762] [757] In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 1 _Baldwin's Circuit Court Reports_, p. 571 et seq. See Appendix B, p. 368. [758] 2 _Paine's Reports_, 350. See Appendix B, p. 369. [759] 16 _Peters' Reports_, 613. [760] 2 _Western Law Journal_, 282. See Appendix B, p. 371. [761] 1 _Baldwin's Circuit Court Reports_, 571; Hurd, _Law of Freedom and Bondage_, Vol. II, p. 444. [762] 16 _Peters' Reports_, 613.