The United States and Latin AmericaLatané, John Holladay
History
The United States and Latin America
Latané, John Holladay
Latin America -- Foreign relations -- United States; United States -- Foreign relations -- Latin America
It is not probable that our participation in the Great War will result
in any weakening of the Monroe Doctrine. That principle has been fully
justified by a century of experience. It has saved South America from
the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa and Asia
have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. It would be strange
indeed if the United States, having insisted on the non-interference of
European powers in America when it was itself a weak power from the
military point of view, should now in the plenitude of its power relax
what has been for so many years the cardinal principle of its foreign
policy. The abandonment of our policy of neutrality and isolation does
not by any means mean the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. President
Wilson made this quite clear in his address to the Senate on January 22,
1917, when he said:
I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one
accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the
doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend
its polity over any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its
own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid,
the little along with the great and powerful. I am proposing
that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which
would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a
net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own
affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no
entangling alliance in a concert of power.
The policy of isolation or the avoidance of entangling alliances, which
so many Americans confuse with the Monroe Doctrine, is in principle
quite distinct from it and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power. The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps be best
illustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal in
the event of attack from some European power, on condition that England
would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any European power
in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle. Such a treaty
would, however, be a departure from our traditional policy of isolation,
originally announced by Washington and Jefferson.
The participation of the United States in the League of Nations would,
if that League be considered an entangling alliance, be a departure from
the policy of isolation but not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In
order to allay the fears of Americans on this point, President Wilson
caused to be inserted in the constitution of the League of Nations the
following clause:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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