First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British interests; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a French force, a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles had obtained by the overthrow of the constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the differences between them and the British ministers (where they did differ) were merely feints on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.[74] The United States government did not relax its efforts in behalf of the South American states with the recognition of England, but continued to exert itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their independence by the other powers of Europe, particularly Spain.[75] Mr. Clay tried to get the other members of the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia, to use their good offices with Spain for the purpose of inducing her to recognize her late colonies, but the emperor of Russia, the head of the alliance, continued to preach to Spain "not only no recognition of their independence, but active war for their subjugation." To the request of the United States he replied that, out of respect for "the indisputable titles of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate the determination of the king of Spain.[76] It was some ten years before Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient claims. FOOTNOTES: [37] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. III, p. 538. [38] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 177. [39] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and 116. [40] Lyman, "Diplomacy of the United States." 2 Vols. Boston, 1828, Vol. II, p. 432. Romero, "Mexico and the United States." [41] Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 217-270. [42] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851. [43] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 139. [44] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142. [45] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 44. [46] "Adams's Diary," September, 1817, to December, 1818. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458. [47] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10. [48] Stapleton, "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff.