"Many of your old acquaintances and friends," wrote Washington to Lafayette, "are concerned with me in the administration of this government. By having Mr. Jefferson at the head of the department of state, Mr. Jay of the judiciary, Hamilton of the treasury, and Knox that of war, I feel myself supported by able coadjutors, who harmonise extremely well together." Randolph, the Attorney-General, had never come in contact with Lafayette and consequently was not mentioned by Washington. This list of the chief administrators of the new Government must have reassured Lafayette, as well as other friends of the experiment, who wished to see it given a fair trial. They feared that the first administration might be given over to its enemies, who would be inclined to decrease rather than to strengthen its powers. Before the elections, General Lincoln had confessed to his former companion in arms, General Washington, his apprehension lest "the Anti-Federalists would try to get into office men unfriendly to the Constitution and so break it down, or men who would change many of its provisions at an early date." The attitude of the President and of most of his Cabinet, it was well known, was in favour of an efficient central power. John Adams, the Vice-President, had long been an advocate of a stronger frame, and now made good his words by casting the deciding vote in twenty ties in the Senate, every time in favour of centralised authority where there was any doubt involved. By one of these close votes authority was given the President to remove an official without the necessary consent of the Senate. The Constitution was silent on this point, and its decision favourable to the Executive greatly increased the prerogatives of that office. This summer of 1789 was a time of anxiety for the friends of the new Government. They could scarcely hope that the new machinery had no flaw. At any moment an unforeseen defect might bring the whole to a standstill. Friction fatal to continued happiness might arise between the different departments of the General Government or between it and the component States. The people of some section might refuse to be bound by the General Government. During the heat of debate in the South Carolina Convention, a delegate had defiantly declared that his people would not take part in the new Government, if adopted, if not compelled to do so by force; unless a standing army which the new autocrat would possess should ram it down their throats with the points of bayonets, like the Turkish Janizaries enforcing despotic laws. As time went on and none of these calamities happened, a general confidence took possession of the people. At last they had come into a time of general agreement which would allow the experiment of self-government a fair test. Two States remained out of the Union, but time was expected to bring them in. CHAPTER VIII SUMMONING THE GENII OF THE IMPLIED POWERS