214. Having replied to these objections, let us now endeavour to realise our present position. It is briefly as follows:—What we have done is to show that a future state is possible, and to demolish any so-called scientific objection that might be raised against it. The evidence in favour of the doctrine is not derived from us. It comes to us from two sources: in the first place, from the statements made concerning Christ; and, in the second place, from that intense longing for immortality which civilised man has invariably possessed. The case stands thus: certain evidence from these two sources in favour of our doctrine has been adduced, but scientific objections have been raised against the possibility of the doctrine itself, and these we have attempted to overcome. But while we may suppose the scientific objections to the doctrine itself surmounted, there yet remains an equally strong scientific objection to that portion of the evidence in favour of the doctrine which is derived from the Christian records. ‘Granting,’ it may be said to us, ‘that immortality is possible, what reason have we, beyond certain vague yearnings, for believing it likely? No doubt, if Christ rose from the dead, the probability in favour of it would be very strong; but we have an objection to the assumed fact of the resurrection of Christ no less formidable than that which you have overcome with regard to the doctrine of immortality itself.’ 215. We must now proceed to examine the validity of this objection, and in so doing we find it convenient to approach the problem of the universe not from the side of the future but from that of the past. We have already (Art. 85) defined the principle of Continuity, in virtue of which we believe ourselves entitled to discuss every event which occurs in the universe, without one single exception, and to deduce from it, if we can, the condition of things that preceded the event—this being also in the universe. We have likewise given reasons for believing that the visible universe must have had a beginning in time, and it may be desirable to recapitulate these here. In the first place, it is generally allowed by men of science that atoms form the stuff or substance out of which the visible universe is built. Why, then, it is asked by the materialists, cannot we suppose these atoms to be infinite in number, in which case, as far as energy is concerned, we may very well suppose this universe to last from eternity to eternity; and if in addition we may conceive these eternally existing atoms to be in some sense alive, have we not here a hypothesis which will explain the continuous life of the universe as well as its continuous energy? Let us in the meantime reply to the first statement in the hypothesis, reserving that part of it which concerns life for a future occasion (Art. 240).