All these elements of value have been presented, and have been supported by able arguments. No one has offered a method of separating them. While there is universal recognition of their existence, in the case of many properties, they are supported by nothing visible or tangible. They are practically inseparable, one from another. They are not always present, and the application of any such arbitrary rule as that suggested by Mr. Alvord would make it possible to place values which were purely fictitious. Therefore, it follows that, if they are to be considered at all, they must be treated as parts of one intangible value, and that value must be derived from a study of the income account of the property. There are other points to be noted as reasons why no such elements of value may attach to the physical property. Any value of an old and well-established property in excess of a fair return on its physical property (in other words, any intangible value) must be limited and restricted, when used for rate-making purposes, by the value to the consumer of the services rendered. The Courts hold so squarely that the rates charged for services must not be more than the particular service is worth, and that the Company may exact a fair return on property actually being used, that it is not conceivable that any valuation which attempts to attach fictitious elements of value to physical property can be sustained. This argument is not intended as an attempt to show that intangible values are improper and that where they exist rates should be lowered. It is contended that the determination of rates that will be just and fair to all competing companies involves other consideration than the valuation of either physical or intangible properties, and that when all these rate-making problems are properly solved, there will remain large intangible values on the well-designed plants. It is further contended that the work of valuation should separate the tangible and intangible elements, so that the further work of rate-making or assessment may not be complicated by improper elements which are included among the items of the physical properties. In consideration of franchise value, the history of the corporation should be investigated with a view to determine what part the public played in the creation of the property. The granting of aid bonds, of public lands, and of aid money to railroads, the giving of encouragement to water-works companies by the payment of excessive hydrant rentals, are illustrations of the fostering and development of public service utilities by the public to such an extent as to justify in a large measure the claim that in many cases the allowance of an intangible value is improper as against the public.