"But although the state ought for these reasons [applicable to this case—not general], to be bound to recognize the value agreed upon in 1884 as part of the property upon which a reasonable return can be demanded, we do not think an increase in that valuation ought to be allowed upon the theory suggested by the Court below. Because the amount of gas supplied has increased to the extent stated, and the other and tangible property of the corporations has increased so largely in value, is not, as it seems to us, any reason for attributing a like proportional increase in the value of the franchises. Real estate may have increased in value very largely, as also the personal property, without any necessary increase in the value of the franchises. Its past value was founded upon the opportunity of obtaining these enormous and excessive returns upon the property of the company, without legislative interference with the price for the supply of gas, but that immunity for the future was, of course, uncertain, and the moment it ceased and the legislature reduced the earnings to a reasonable sum, the great value of the franchises would be at once and unfavorably affected, but how much so it is not possible for us to see. The value would most certainly not increase." The Court did not concur in the increase of the franchise value, and, in dismissing this subject, says: "What has been said herein regarding the value of the franchises in this case has been necessarily founded upon its own peculiar facts, and the decision can form no precedent in regard to the valuation of franchises generally where the facts are not similar to those in the case before us." It appears, then, from this, the latest case, that: _1._—The view of the lower Court that a franchise or intangible value is not separable, and that if there be a value it must be determined from the earnings, is concurred in by the Supreme Court. _2._—That the arbitrary increase of franchise value, by the lower Court, proportional to the normal increase of the physical property, is not concurred in. _3._—Inferentially, it appears that the acquiescence of the State in the franchise value of 1884 is the main reason for permitting that value to stand, and it would seem to follow, from the reasoning of the Court, that it is very questionable whether any franchise or intangible value based on excessive rates should be allowed to stand. Another view of franchise values, as stated by George H. Benzenberg, Past-President, Am. Soc. C. E., in discussing water-works franchises, is as follows: