The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human NatureJames, William
ReligionComparative
The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature
James, William
Conversion; Experience (Religion); Philosophy and religion; Psychology, Religious; Religion
At our last meeting, we considered the healthy‐minded temperament, the
temperament which has a constitutional incapacity for prolonged suffering,
and in which the tendency to see things optimistically is like a water of
crystallization in which the individual’s character is set. We saw how
this temperament may become the basis for a peculiar type of religion, a
religion in which good, even the good of this world’s life, is regarded as
the essential thing for a rational being to attend to. This religion
directs him to settle his scores with the more evil aspects of the
universe by systematically declining to lay them to heart or make much of
them, by ignoring them in his reflective calculations, or even, on
occasion, by denying outright that they exist. Evil is a disease; and
worry over disease is itself an additional form of disease, which only
adds to the original complaint. Even repentance and remorse, affections
which come in the character of ministers of good, may be but sickly and
relaxing impulses. The best repentance is to up and act for righteousness,
and forget that you ever had relations with sin.
Spinoza’s philosophy has this sort of healthy‐mindedness woven into the
heart of it, and this has been one secret of its fascination. He whom
Reason leads, according to Spinoza, is led altogether by the influence
over his mind of good. Knowledge of evil is an “inadequate” knowledge, fit
only for slavish minds. So Spinoza categorically condemns repentance. When
men make mistakes, he says,—
“One might perhaps expect gnawings of conscience and repentance to
help to bring them on the right path, and might thereupon conclude
(as every one does conclude) that these affections are good
things. Yet when we look at the matter closely, we shall find that
not only are they not good, but on the contrary deleterious and
evil passions. For it is manifest that we can always get along
better by reason and love of truth than by worry of conscience and
remorse. Harmful are these and evil, inasmuch as they form a
particular kind of sadness; and the disadvantages of sadness,” he
continues, “I have already proved, and shown that we should strive
to keep it from our life. Just so we should endeavor, since
uneasiness of conscience and remorse are of this kind of
complexion, to flee and shun these states of mind.”(66)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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