So far the Sûtras have declared that the Brahman which forms the object of enquiry is different from the non-intelligent Pradhâna, which is merely an object of fruition for intelligent beings. They now proceed to show that Brahman--which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted by supreme bliss--is different from the individual soul, which is subject to karman, whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure state that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless sufferings, springing from the soul's contact with Prakriti (Pradhâna). 13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of multiplication. We read in the text of the Taittirîyas, 'Different from this Self, which consists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--Here the doubt arises whether the Self consisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the inner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'jîva.' (i.e. living self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self, i.e. the jîva.--It _is_ that inner Self, the Pûrvapakshin contends. For the text says 'of that this, i.e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the sârîra Self'; and sârîra means that which is joined to a body, in other words, the so-called jîva.--But, an objection is raised, the text enumerates the different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of bliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was, at the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the end teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world (II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since Scripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.-- That cause of the world, the Pûrvapakshin rejoins, is not different from the jîva; for in the text of the Chândogyas that Being which first is described as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in co-ordination with the jîva ('having entered into them with that living Self' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co- ordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person here is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought can very well be ascribed to an intelligent jîva. The connexion of the whole Taittirîya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause, 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest,' the true nature of the jîva, free from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the jîva in this form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all