The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja: Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48
Religion
The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja: Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48
Vedanta
we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature
is pure light? When an object of light which has parts and
distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it
appears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when
some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing
which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and
hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts
on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the
object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where
there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects,
indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their
distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is
not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the
essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which
consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be
conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidyâ.
We, moreover, must ask the following question: 'Is this indistinctness
which you consider an effect of avidyâ put an end to by the rise of true
knowledge or not?' On the latter alternative there would be no final
release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is.
'It is of an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature
then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If
it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect
of avidyâ, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then
Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-
eternal.--And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no
definable substrate for it we have shown above.--He, moreover, who holds
the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult
to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if
the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place
even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this
would be the theory of a general Void.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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