for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84], different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not' is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brahma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man. The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas) has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has