Whether the severity of the weather by which the roads were dreadfully cut up, or the privations which his army experienced in traversing an exhausted country, repressed his activity, Massena certainly did not press the British with the vigour that might have been expected from an army so immensely superior in its numbers, and particularly in cavalry, an arm so effective in pursuit. The French had formed an imperfect estimate of the magnificent position upon which Wellington was retiring. In their rear, the allies had abundant supplies--while the French advance led through an exhausted district, an unfriendly population behind, and a host of irregulars around, waiting an opportunity to become actively aggressive. In the rear of the Prince of Esling, Trant, on the Coimbra road, had five thousand militia--Wilson was at Busaco, in similar strength--while from the north, Silviera was advancing with fifteen thousand men, and Bacillar with eight thousand. The French marshal soon felt the activity of these partisans. Supposing that Coimbra was safe from aggression, he had left his hospitals there, as he believed, in perfect security, protected by a company of marines attached to the Imperial Guard. Trant, by a sudden and well-executed march, threw himself between Coimbra and the advancing army, and captured the entire of the hospitals and stores, with the marines left for their defence.[120] It was said that the French were quite ignorant both of the position of the lines and the extent of their defences--and that they were unprepared for finding themselves totally barred from farther effort by works, embracing eight leagues of country, and stretching from the Tagus to the ocean. But that such an undertaking as fortifying Torres Vedras--a herculean task requiring the labour of thousands to effect, and an enormous expenditure of money and stores to carry on--that this could have proceeded to its completion, without its progress being reported to the invaders, is nothing but a mere romance, and cannot for a moment be credited.[121] Massena, after a three days’ _reconnaissance_, and under the advice of his chief engineers, abandoned all hope of forcing this singular position--and when Torres Vedras is described, it will be admitted that the marshal’s decision was correct. These celebrated lines, constructed to protect an embarkation should it be necessary, and cover the capital from attack, were planned by Lord Wellington, and executed chiefly by Colonel Fletcher and Captain Jones of the engineers--and to describe them, the features of the country over which they extended must be briefly noticed.