The plan, notwithstanding that many unexpected obstacles delayed the columns of attack, succeeded. The French, never supposing that the bridge would be attempted until the pass was first carried, and a passage opened for the guns, were astounded soon after daybreak, on seeing the 50th and a wing of the 71st rush from the cover of a hill, and commence an escalade in three different places. After a sharp resistance, they abandoned the fort, and rushing through the _tête-du-pont_, retreated over the bridge to find shelter, as they hoped, in Fort Ragusa. But the coward who commanded there, panic-struck, had already destroyed the communication; and in a vain attempt to avoid the bayonets of their assailants who followed them pell-mell, many perished in the Tagus, and the remainder, amounting to two hundred and fifty, including the governor, were made prisoners. Fort Ragusa was abandoned by the commandant, and the redoubt, _tête-du-pont_, pontoons, and carriages, with an immense quantity of stores, were destroyed, the victors in this brilliant affair having sustained but a very inconsiderable loss. The commandant of Fort Ragusa retreated to Navalmoral. There he was placed under arrest--tried by a court-martial, and shot at Talavera, a fate the cowardly desertion of his own comrades so richly merited.[180] Sir Rowland retired without molestation by the Truxillo road, and took up his former quarters at Merida. Too late, the intelligence of his march had reached the French marshals--and though both took instant measures to save the bridge and intercept the expedition, their efforts were unavailing. Marmont reached the Tagus “too late to prevent the evil, and without the means of repairing it;” and Soult, finding that the British rear-guard had already passed Truxillo, gave up the hope of overtaking it, and retired to Seville. A less fortunate attempt by Ballasteros, was made on the French works on the line of the Guadalete. A division of the army of Andalusia, of four thousand five hundred men, under General Corvoux, having occupied Bornos, the Spanish general assembled a force of six thousand at Majada de Ruiz over night, and crossed the Guadalete unnoticed. But, notwithstanding a surprise, the French easily repulsed the attack; and Ballasteros was driven across the river in confusion, and with the loss of a fourth of his entire force. Nothing can prove the miserable inefficiency of the Spanish troops more strongly, than the result of this wretched attempt on Bornos. Every circumstance favoured it: in force they were stronger by a fourth; and yet an enemy inferior in number, and taken by surprise, not only routed their assailants, but would have literally destroyed them, had not the friendly waters of the Guadalete covered their ignominious flight. ADVANCE FROM THE AGUEDA, TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.