The light division, when morning dawned, continued its advance, crossing the Tormes at Huerta; while the heavy Germans, under Bock, overtook the French rear-guard in position on the heights of La Serna, protected by some squadrons of hussars. These were dispersed by a charge of the 11th and 16th--while the heavy brigade rode directly at the squares, and broke them by a furious onset. Numbers were cut down-- others saved themselves by throwing away their arms, hiding in the woods, and afterwards joining the retreating columns. In this spirited affair nearly one thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the victors. As a cavalry exploit, that of La Serna has rarely been equalled, and never, in its brilliant results, surpassed. Bock’s casualties were comparatively trifling, amounting in killed and wounded only to some seventy or eighty men. Clausel, who commanded _en chef_ after Marmont was disabled, retreated with great rapidity. Viewed from the summit of La Serna, the French exhibited a countless mass of all arms, confusedly intermingled. While the range permitted it, the horse-artillery annoyed them with round-shot--but, by rapid marching, they gradually disappeared-- while, opportunely, a strong corps of cavalry and a brigade of guns joined from the army of the North, and covered the retreat until they fell back upon their reserves. Although Salamanca was in every respect a decisive battle, how much more fatal must it not have proved, had darkness not shut in, and robbed the conquerors of half the fruits of victory? The total demolition of the French left was effected by six o’clock, and why should the right attack have not been equally successful? Had such been the case, in what a hopeless situation the broken army must have found itself! The Tormes behind, a reserve of three entire divisions, who during the contest had scarcely drawn a trigger, ready to assail in front--nothing could have averted total ruin; and to the French, Salamanca would have proved the bloodiest field on record. One great error stripped victory of its results. Either the small force by which the Arapiles was defended had been undervalued, or incompetent means employed by Lord Wellington to carry it. Unfortunately a Portuguese brigade had been intrusted with that service. They were admirably led on--conquest was on the wing around them--everywhere the advance of the British was triumphant--their numerical force was five times greater than that of the defenders of the height--but the attack was feebly made, and, on the show of a determined resistance, as quickly abandoned. This unexpected reverse induced Bonnet’s corps to rally-- and by it, the fourth division was suddenly and unexpectedly assailed. A plunging fire from the Arapiles fell upon their flank and rear--the tide of battle turned--the fourth gave ground--and, as yet untamed by British steel, the enemy cheered loudly and rushed on--and had not Clinton’s division been promptly carried into action, it is hard