The Victories of Wellington and the British ArmiesMaxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
History
The Victories of Wellington and the British Armies
Maxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
Great Britain -- History, Military -- 19th century; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
Soult halted his different corps in the intrenched camp of Bayonne,
and Wellington cantoned his troops two miles in front of his opponent,
in lines extending from the sea to the Nivelle, his right stretching
to Cambo and his left resting on the coast. This change in his
cantonments was productive of serious advantages. His wearied soldiery
obtained rest and many comforts which in their mountain bivouacs were
unattainable; and though the enemy possessed unlimited command of a
well-supplied district for their foraging parties, and the surface
over which Lord Wellington might obtain supplies was necessarily
circumscribed, his direct communication with the sea, and a month’s
rest in tolerable quarters, recruited his exhausted army and produced
the best results.[260]
But Wellington merely waited to mature his preparations--and, to
extend his line of supply, he determined to seize the strong ground
between the Nive and the Adour, and confine Soult to the immediate
vicinity of his own camp. Accordingly on the 9th of December, the left
wing of the allies, advancing by the road of St. Jean de Luz, gained
the heights domineering the intrenchments of the French. The right
forded the Nive above Cambo--while, by a bridge of boats, Clinton
crossed at Nostariz, and obliged the enemy, to avoid being cut off,
to fall back on Bayonne. At night, the French having retired to their
posts within the fortified position they had occupied, Hope, with the
left of the allies, recrossed the river to his former cantonments,
having a direct communication open with Sir Rowland Hill, who had
taken a position with his division, his right on the Adour, his centre
in the village of St. Pierre, and his left appuied on the heights of
Ville Franque. Morillo’s division was in observation at Urcuray, and a
cavalry corps at Hasparren.
The relative positions of the rival armies were greatly different.
Soult possessed immense advantages; his _corps d’armée_ were compactly
bivouacked, with easy communications, every facility for rapid
concentration, and the citadel of Bayonne to protect him if he found
it necessary to fall back. The allies extended over an irregular line
intersected by the Nive, with bad roads, that rendered any rapid
reinforcement of a threatened point altogether impracticable. Hence,
Wellington was everywhere open to attack--and Soult could fall on him
with overwhelming numbers and force an unequal combat, while but a part
of the allies should be opposed to the combined efforts of the enemy.
The French marshal was aware of this--and it was not long before he
endeavoured to profit by his advantage.
The left of the allies, under Sir John Hope, had the fifth division
(Hay’s) posted on the heights of Barouillet, with Campbell’s Portuguese
brigade on a narrow ridge immediately in their front. At Arrangues,
the light division was formed on a strong height, at a distance of two
miles from the fifth.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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