All dispositions were made for the intended attack. At eight at night, the army were to move in two columns--and the right, which was to force the bridge and penetrate to Saldanha, was actually getting under arms, when couriers arrived “loaded with heavy tidings.” The French were moving in all directions to cut the English off;[55] the corps which had been marching south, was suddenly halted at Talavera; two strong divisions were moving from Placentia; the Badajoz army was in full march on Salamanca--and Napoleon himself in the field, determined, as it was reported, to “sweep the British before him to the ocean.” This was, in truth, disastrous intelligence. The orders to advance were countermanded instantly--the troops, who had already been mustering, were retired to their quarters, and the object of the expedition seemed virtually ended. The campaign was indeed a tissue of mistakes-- “operating with feeble allies, acting on false information, advancing to-day, retiring to-morrow, with every thing to harass and nothing to excite the soldier, until at last, the ill-fated and ill-planned expedition terminated in a ruinous retreat.”[56] In making preparations for a rapid march before an enemy, that from report was overwhelming if not avoided, the 23rd of December was consumed, and the general plan for regressive operations was arranged by instantly retreating on Gallicia. To pass the Esla, three routs were open,--one by the bridge of Mansilla, a second by the ferry of Valencia, and a third by the bridge of Castro Gonsalo, over which the great road to Benevente leads. Mansilla was occupied and exhausted by the Spanish army, and the roads of Valencia and Gonsalo afforded the best retreat. A double means of retirement would expedite the movements--and neither the magazines at Lamora nor Benevente would be left to the French. Astorga was named the point of union, as there, if pressed, battle could be offered. Romana was requested to move upon Leon--after holding, to the last extremity, the bridge of Mansilla. All arrangements being completed, Moore commenced retreating on the 24th. Hope’s division fell back on Castro Gonzalo, and Baird’s on Valencia; while cavalry patrols were pushed forward on the Carion, with orders to retire at nightfall of the 25th, giving the reserve and light infantry, which formed the rear-guard, a start of some three or four hours in advance. All was admirably executed--and the columns, unmolested, reached their respective destinations. The retreat continued, marked by some occasional affairs between the cavalry of the advanced and rear-guard, which terminated invariably in favour of the latter. The hussar regiments behaved most nobly--and on every occasion, regardless of numbers, or the more discouraging movements of a retreat, they sought the combat, and always came off the conquerors.