The Victories of Wellington and the British ArmiesMaxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
History
The Victories of Wellington and the British Armies
Maxwell, W. H. (William Hamilton)
Great Britain -- History, Military -- 19th century; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
By easy marches, Sir Arthur reached the Douro on the 7th. His army
was in a bad condition, suffering alike from their past fatigues in
Gallicia, and a total want of every necessary and comfort. The country
was unable to supply him, and he had no means to procure by land or
water carriage, assistance from his own commissariate. The hospitals
were crowded--officers and men were without pay, provisions, or
even shoes. Still, though disappointed in remittances, and unable to
support his army with any regard to their comforts, the troops had the
most implicit confidence in their leader, and very justly ascribed
the privations they endured to causes over which their general had no
control. The spirit of the army was still unbroken--and much as its
physical strength might have deteriorated since it marched from Coimbra
to attack Soult, its gallantry was undiminished, and its desire to meet
the enemy as ardent as it had been ever.
Spanish affairs, considered generally, had also assumed a more
favourable appearance; and although the French force in Spain was
still immense, there being within the Pyrenees one hundred and fifty
thousand men, the reverses Napoleon had encountered at Wagram, and the
threatening aspect of affairs in Germany, precluded any chance that
his lieutenants on the Peninsula would be further reinforced. Hence a
spirit of reaction was encouraged in the Spaniards, accompanied by a
reasonable prospect of success.
On reaching Abrantes on the 7th, it was correctly ascertained that,
instead of retiring on Madrid, Victor was concentrating at Merida,
intending, probably, to cross the Guadiana, and attack Cuesta before
the British could come to his assistance. Propositions therefore for
a combined movement were made by Sir Arthur Wellesley to the “Spanish
general,” and willingly acceded to--and the British moved forward to
the Teitar, to unite, as it was believed, in an operation upon Madrid.
A most able plan for marching at once for the recovery of the capital
was arranged at a conference between the allied commanders.[85] The
British and Spanish armies, taking the right bank of the Tagus, were
to advance directly forward. Venegas, with fourteen thousand Spaniards,
was to threaten Aranjuez, and, if possible, take possession of Toledo;
while two other Spanish divisions should hold the passes of Banos and
Perales; and five thousand Portuguese, under Sir Robert Wilson, were to
act independently, and annoy the French flanks and rear as they best
could.
The British consequently moved by Salvatiera and Placentia, effecting a
junction with Cuesta at Oropesa on the 20th of July. On the 22nd Victor
had retired and taken a position on the Alberche. The opportunity was
at once given for attacking him, but Cuesta obstinately declined; and
Victor, hearing that Wilson was already in his rear at Escalona, made a
night march on Torrijos.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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