World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
In accordance with my habitual practice, I applied the system of placing
responsibility upon my carefully selected heads of departments, giving
them commensurate authority, and holding them to account for results.
Because the task was such a great one, this was the only possible way in
which the operations of the force could have been successfully
conducted. I say, successfully conducted, because in a "business" of
this kind, "good enough" and "to-morrow" may mean disaster; that is, it
is a case of keeping both information and operations up to the minute.
If the personnel and equipment of the staff are not completely capable
of this, it is more than a partial failure, and the result is an
ever-present danger. There were men in this great war who "went to
pieces" simply because they tried to do everything themselves. This
administrative vice of attempting to control every detail, even
insignificant ones, to which military men seem particularly addicted, it
had always been my policy to avoid. Business at Grosvenor Gardens
developed to such an extent that about a thousand messages were every
day received in our office or sent from it; and of these 60 per cent.
were in code. Obviously it was impossible for the Force Commander to
keep constantly at his finger ends all these details. All department
heads, therefore, were selected because they were officers who could be
depended upon to handle these matters and make decisions independently;
they were all strong men, and it is to their combined efforts that the
success of our operations was due. You would have to search a long time
among the navies of the world before you could find an abler convoy
officer than Captain Byron A. Long; an abler naval constructor than
Captain L. B. McBride; an abler man to have charge of the finances of
our naval forces, the purchase of supplies and all kinds of material
than Captain (S.C.) Eugene C. Tobey; abler aviation officers than
Captain H. I. Cone and Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; an abler
chief of operations than Captain R. H. Leigh, or an abler intelligence
officer than Commander J. V. Babcock. These men, and others of the
fourteen department heads, acted as a kind of cabinet. Many of them
handled matters which, though wholly essential to the success of the
forces, were quite outside of my personal knowledge or experience, and
consequently they had to be men in whose ability to guide me in such
matters I could place complete confidence. As an example of this I may
cite one of the duties of Captain Tobey. Nearly all of the very
considerable financial transactions he was entrusted with were "Greek"
to me, but he had only to show me the right place on the numerous
documents, and I signed my name in absolute confidence that the
interests of the Government were secure.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account