18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent. 19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner _New York_ upon which I took passage furnishes a typical example. She was instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about nine P.M., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous area. 20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations. 21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion. 22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, _particularly destroyers_, and until the enemy submarine _moral_ is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity--increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small. "More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand. 23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.