Petrobey also established another small camp on the hills to the east of Tripoli, to guard the road between it and the plain of Argos and Nauplia. They had already intercepted and had a small skirmish with troops coming to that place from Nauplia. The loss on the Greek side was about one hundred; on that of the Turks nearly double, for when it came to hand-to-hand fighting the slow and short-legged Turk was no match for the fresh vigor of the mountain-folk. On this occasion they had lain in ambush on both sides of the road, and opened fire simultaneously at the regiment as it passed. The Turks had with them a contingent of cavalry, but on the rocky and wooded ground they were perfectly useless; and their infantry, leaving the road, had driven the Greeks from their ground, though in the first attack they had lost severely. But this readiness to retreat when necessary, and not waste either powder or lives profitlessly, was in accordance with the policy which Nicholas had indicated, and had been the first to put in practice at Karitaena; and it was exactly this harassing, guerilla warfare, in which cavalry could not be brought into play, in which attack was unexpected and flight was immediate upon any sign of a regular engagement, which made the Turks feel they were fighting with shadows. Though their number at the beginning of the war exceeded those of the Greeks, yet each engagement of the kind lessened them in a far greater proportion than their enemies, who seemed, on the other hand, to be mustering fresh troops every day. Had Petrobey at this period consented to give battle in the plains it is probable that his army would have been wiped out if they had fought to a close, and it says much for his wisdom that he persisted in a policy which was tedious and distasteful to him personally. But the Greeks were acquiring every day fresh experience and knowledge, while the strength of the Turks, which lay in their admirable cavalry and their guns, was lying useless. In the north, however, affairs had not sped so prosperously. Germanos, who was practically commander-in-chief of the army at Kalavryta--less wise than his colleague at Valtetzi--had risked an attack on the citadel at Patras and suffered a severe defeat. As at Karitaena, a cavalry charge ought to have made him follow Nicholas's example, but he stuck with misplaced bravery to his attempt, until a second body of cavalry took him in the rear and cut off his retreat. With desperate courage his men cut their way through the latter, but a remnant only came through; his loss was enormous compared to that sustained by the Turks, and nothing was gained by it, for the citadel of Patras still remained in the hands of the enemy.