The War and DemocracySeton-Watson, R. W. (Robert William)
History
The War and Democracy
Seton-Watson, R. W. (Robert William)
Europe -- Politics and government -- 1871-1918; Nationalism -- Europe; World War, 1914-1918
The relations between Prince Bismarck and the old Emperor, who was over
ninety when he died in 1888, form a touching passage in modern history.
Although his grandson has publicly claimed for him a peculiar measure of
divine inspiration, his strength lay in his implicit confidence in his
great minister. Bismarck's attitude to him, as described in his _Memoirs_,
is rather like that of an old family retainer who has earned by long and
faithful service the right to assert his views and to pit his judgment
against his master's. His one formidable antagonist was the Empress; and
long experience, he tells us, enabled him to judge whether difficulties in
persuading the old Kaiser to adopt a given line of policy were due to
his own judgment or conceived "in the interests of domestic peace." The
faithful servant had his own appropriate methods of winning his way in
either case.
But with the new Kaiser the old minister's astuteness availed nothing,
and the story of Bismarck's curt dismissal, after thirty-eight years
of continuous service, from the post which he had created for himself,
illustrates the danger of framing a constitution to meet a particular
temporary situation. Bismarck, put out of action by his own machinery,
retired growling to his country seat, and lived to see the reversal of his
foreign policy and the exposure of Germany, through the Franco-Russian
Alliance, to the one danger he always dreaded, an attack on both flanks.
Like Germany's present rulers, Bismarck was not a scrupulous man; but
unlike them he was shrewd and far-sighted, and understood the statesmen and
the peoples with whom he had to deal. The main object of his foreign policy
was to preserve the prestige of the German army as the chief instrument of
power in Central Europe, and to allow the new Germany, after three wars in
seven years, time to develop in peace and to consolidate her position as
one of the Great Powers.
The situation was not an easy one; for Germany's rapid rise to power,
and the methods by which she had acquired it, had not made her popular.
Bismarck's foreign policy was defensive throughout, and he pursued it along
two lines. He sought to strengthen Germany by alliances, and to weaken her
rivals by embroiling them with one another. The great fruit of his policy
was the formation, completed in 1882, of the Triple Alliance between
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.
There was nothing sentimental about the Triple Alliance. The Italians hate
the Austrians, whom they drove out of Venice as recently as 1866, while
neither the German Austrians nor the other races in the Dual Monarchy have
any love lost for the Prussians. But Bismarck decided that this combination
was the safest in Germany's interest: so he set to work to play upon
Austria's fear of Russia, and to embroil Italy with France in North Africa;
and his manoeuvres were duly rewarded.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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