For all that, it is a pity that years ago the Government did not take power on its own behalf, or give provisional power to the Bank of England, to issue legal tender notes of £1 and 10_s._ denomination. Notes of high denomination are useless for ordinary currency purposes. The recent crisis has demonstrated, once and for all, their uselessness. Because this provision had never been made, and because the country had no machinery for providing small currency in emergencies, new machinery had to be improvised. This entailed delay, which, though it had no grave consequences, resulted in needless loss. It was responsible in chief measure for the prolonged holiday, which was a joy to some people and a sorrow to others. However, now that we have the machinery, let us keep it to use, not to abuse. After all, very little of the new paper currency has been needed. Having, then, in the crisis only their cash reserves to rely upon, those reserves which some critics have constantly insisted have ever been too slender, the banks came through comfortably, successfully, thoroughly justifying the confidence reposed in them. This confidence has strengthened as the days have gone by. It shows that confidence is of greater value than “credit.” Such a statement takes on the aspect of a paradox. Though wealth was frozen, and though the creation of the highest class of wealth was greatly slowed down, verging on stoppage, still confidence remained. This appears to me to be confidence not only in the soundness of our banking system, but confidence in our entire economic structure, in the wisdom of Government, in the wealth of the nation, in the strength of our army and navy, in the holiness of our crusade, and in the strength of our national character. But would this confidence remain were our banking system to fall? As Mr. Lloyd George said in Parliament, the mere knowledge of the currency facilities being available gave confidence. That is, it strengthened confidence in the nation’s financial fabric. CHAPTER XXIII SOME CONCLUSIONS