In the latter part of February Walker sent an aide, Major Baldwin, from Rivas by Panama, to Lockridge, confirming the latter in his command on the river, and also informing him of the importance of early communication either around or across the lake. The orders sent to Lockridge were, if he found it impossible to take Castillo and San Carlos without great sacrifice, to cut a road from the river either to Chontales or the southern shore of the lake, and march by land to Rivas. The cause of these orders will hereafter appear; and it is sufficient here to say, that one chief reason for Walker’s holding Rivas was, the apprehension that Lockridge, reaching the Meridional department, might be placed in an awkward position by finding the town in the possession of the Allies. Baldwin arrived at San Juan del Norte about the middle of March, and nearly at the same time with some hundred and thirty fresh men, principally from Mobile and Texas, and directed respectively by Major W. C. Capers and Captain Marcellus French. With this reinforcement under Capers and French, Lockridge’s numbers had been so reduced by desertion and sickness, that his effective force scarcely reached four hundred. The men, however, were for the most part of excellent quality, and in other hands might have accomplished much. French’s command particularly was, by general consent, composed of fine materials. But these men arrived too late; and they met on the river bands which had been disorganized by bad conduct and ill fortune. Lockridge, however, determined to make another effort to get possession of Castillo Viejo; and with this purpose he prepared nearly his whole command for an attack on the fort. Landing his force a short distance below Castillo and out of sight of the enemy, he led his men by a trail through the woods to a position near an elevation, known as Nelson’s Hill. This elevation commands the fort, and the Costa Ricans having entrenched it were occupying the summit. Along the sides of the hill they had cut some trees and formed a sort of chevaux-de-frise; and by clearing away the undergrowth for some distance around the summit, they had made the approach difficult and dangerous. After reconnoitring the position of the enemy, Lockridge deemed it imprudent to hazard an attack; and calling the principal officers together and asking their opinions, he received the concurrence of all as to the expediency of retiring without engaging the enemy. The resolution was wise, for defeat would almost inevitably have been the result of an attempt on the Costa Rican defences. The opportune moment for taking Castillo had been lost through the incapacity of Titus, and with a month to prepare for a second attack, the enemy had not been idle. Even if the Costa Ricans had been less strongly posted, the moral condition of Lockridge’s force was not such as to warrant ordering them on any hazardous service.