It was necessary to be patient and persevering, and I wrote to the Admiral that I was sorry to find that he had decided not to undertake any further operations, because, in that case, I feared that all we had already done would be lost, and I felt quite satisfied, were we to go away without taking Beyrout, which would free the country from Souliman and Ibrahim Pacha, all the arms we had issued would fall into their hands; that the family of Emir Haider, who was a prisoner in Egypt, had decided to declare for the Sultan, the moment they could get rid of Ibrahim and procure arms, and that I saw no means of doing this but by taking Beyrout; that it was impossible to cross Dog River and attack Ibrahim with Souliman on my right and Osman Bey in front. The latter might be surprised, but it must be done by troops who could march well, because it would not do to be long absent from our camp. To which the Admiral replied in the following terms: “September 30, 1840. “My dear Commodore, “By what process of reasoning you have brought your mind to hazard so unwarrantable an assertion, that unless we take Beyrout all the arms we have issued will fall into the hands of Mehemet Ali’s generals, is to me quite incomprehensible. I assert directly the contrary, and say the attack of a place like Beyrout, having had ample time to prepare for its defence, conducted by a skilful general, would mar all that we have hitherto so successfully done; no place, so circumstanced, ought to be attacked upon rumours, upon surmises, and expectations. “We are certain of sustaining a great loss of men, equally certain are we that, with our present force, and we cannot hold it after getting possession; any number of troops can approach on the front of the town without being annoyed, as we can only command the two flanks. Could we depend on the co-operation of 3000 or 4000 mountaineers at the least, knock down every house in Beyrout, the enemy’s troops would still remain in it, and we shall have to force our way through barricaded streets, placed so low that our shot cannot destroy them. “Under all these circumstances I shall not take upon myself to order an attack on Beyrout of such very doubtful issue. “With respect to what I said to you yesterday, about not entering, at present, into any new enterprise, I did not by any means wish to restrain the operations of our troops against the enemy near our positions, or at any reasonable distance from it. All that has been hitherto performed with so much spirit and ability, as to give me full confidence in the success of similar skirmishes. “Your’s, &c. “ROBERT STOPFORD.” “To Commodore Napier.”