Nothing was, however, further from his Lordship’s intention than allowing the British Consul-General to return. He appears to have been dissatisfied because he was not consulted before the measure was decided on, and he informed the Turkish Minister that he should not require the Consul-General to return, because it might not suit the British Government to establish the Consul-General on the same footing as before; that Mehemet Ali might refuse; and lastly, that Colonel Hodges could not leave Constantinople so suddenly[101]. Of these three arguments the only valid one seems to be, the probability of Mehemet Ali’s refusing the conditions; but even granting that, it would have been more politic to have sent the Consuls with the Turkish Commissioner who bore the firmans, with orders to persuade Mehemet Ali, if possible, to accept them, and to signify to him at the same time that the flags would not be hoisted till that point was arranged. They being on the spot, and in an official capacity, furnished with instructions from the Ambassador at Constantinople, would have seen how far it was possible for Mehemet Ali to accept the firman without risking the tranquillity of Egypt, and would necessarily have more influence on the Pacha than I could have, being totally unprovided with instructions, and not having received a single line from the Ambassador to guide my conduct. On the 15th of February Lord Ponsonby wrote officially to Rechid Pacha[102], disowning having had any thing to do with the firman, and stating that he never had been consulted at all, or knew any thing about it, till every thing was decided, and ordered to be sent to Alexandria. The fact is, the Porte saw that Lord Ponsonby was determined to keep the question open, and therefore arranged the firman without asking his advice. What that advice might have been is hard to say; but we must infer that had he been consulted, the firman would have been much more stringent than it was, and which, as it turned out, was not palatable to the Pacha, who absolutely constrained the Porte to alter it, and give him more favourable terms; in this, as we shall see, he was supported by the majority of the Ambassadors. Footnote 94: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 183. Footnote 95: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 185. Footnote 96: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 185, 192. Footnote 97: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 197. Footnote 98: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 229. Footnote 99: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 229. Footnote 100: See these documents in the _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 247-252. Footnote 101: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 239, 240. Footnote 102: See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 325. CHAPTER XVIII.