“It is to me a matter of regret, that after the transcendant services rendered by the British fleet in the very last operation, you should have thought proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected movements on Gaza, but it certainly is to me much more a cause of surprise, that you should have thought proper to write an official letter, on an occasion where naval co-operation could not even make any serious impression on the inland position of the enemy, and where the sole column of Ramleh was more than doubly sufficient to attain my object. It is well known, that after the defeat of part of the Egyptian cavalry at El-Maishdell on the 15th instant, the enemy never ventured again to meet our troops beyond the river Ascalon, although I advanced our cavalry, which was not half his in number, on the following day, and left it encamped within an hour and a half’s march of Gaza, whilst, at the same time, I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa, on account of the inclement weather and impracticable state of the roads. Under these circumstances, it would, in my opinion, have been perfectly consistent with your responsibility, not to have given any naval assistance in this operation, but without officially declining it after my return to Jaffa, the more so, as I fully agreed with you on the impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate use; but it seems to have been your particular desire to have made the whole transaction a matter of official correspondence, which, although I do not decline, I would fain hope is now brought to a close. “I have, &c., (Signed) “A. JOCHMUS, _Lieut.-General_, “_Commanding the Army of Operation_.” “To Capt. Houston Stewart, R.N., Commanding the Naval Forces off Jaffa.” Footnote 18: _Major-General Sir C. F. Smith to Viscount Palmerston._ My Lord, Head-quarters, Beyrout, Nov. 24, 1840. I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that a prudent adherence to my instructions from the Foreign Office has struck a heavier blow on the army of Ibrahim Pacha than a series of general actions could have achieved. Each succeeding victory could only have withdrawn us so much farther from our resources, without advancing, in any degree, the cause we have in hand. I take not merit to myself, unless it be for my forbearance. For the number and the nature of the troops under my command, and the extended line of coast I have to guard, compelled me to be strictly on the defensive in the towns already in our possession, whilst a forward movement would have been unmilitary and unmeaning.