In the second paragraph he says that it is “understood that Ibrahim must re-enter Egypt by the Desert, or by El Arish, which is the direct road, and the easiest; and by leaving the road free, we act in conformity with the desire of Mazloum Bey and of the Commodore, to offer every facility for his retreat without compromising our military position.” Mazloum Bey, in his letter to the Seraskier, read before the council, according to Mr. Wood, says the impression at Constantinople was that the Egyptian army was disorganized; but that Commodore Napier undeceived him, and pretended that it was in a situation to resist the Imperial army, and that he did not venture to insist on Mehemet Ali giving up the Syrian conscripts, and his arms, guns, and military stores, agreeably to the orders of the Porte; but as they were on the spot, they must be the best judges whether or no they ought to insist on these two conditions. I do Mazloum Bey the justice of saying that he was much wiser than the Divan, for had he proposed those terms, Mehemet Ali would not have given up one ship. Mr. Wood then goes on to advise, that in consequence of the complete disorganization of the Egyptian army, the want of provisions, and the small number of men capable of resistance, the destruction of Maan, the passage over the Desert of Souliman, and the retrograde movement of Ibrahim Pacha with a handful of men without artillery, and as there was now nothing to fear from their antagonist, he should be obliged to ask permission to come to Gaza, which should only be granted on condition of giving up the Syrian troops, his guns, stores, and arms. According to Mr. Wood’s reasoning, this would be, affording him “the facilities required by Mazloum Bey and Commodore Napier;” and “if he persisted in coming to Gaza without those conditions, he would be the aggressor, and must trust to the consequences.” He finishes by saying, this is his humble opinion, founded on mature reflection; and he cannot conceal from himself the danger of Ibrahim coming to Gaza, where he might recruit his army, and allow his father to negotiate more advantageously. “Even now,” he adds, “his General at Gaza has instructions not to attack us, but to deliver up Gaza only with his life. From such facts, your Excellency may judge of the bad faith of the vassal who refuses to surrender his arms on the demand of his Sovereign, which renders his submission incomplete, and even doubtful.” Really, Mr. Wood is a true disciple of the Ambassador’s school; he does not perceive that not the Egyptians, but the Turks, were guilty of bad faith from beginning to end; and that, if the officer at Gaza had delivered it up, Ibrahim’s army would have been compromised.