In the evening of the 24th, the first day of the retreat, the position was on the whole not unsatisfactory. The British Fifth Division had not only defended six miles of front, but with the aid of the cavalry and the 19th Infantry Brigade had met and beaten off von Kluck's enveloping attack. But that attack was soon renewed. On the following morning a heavy movement of German troops southward from Marchiennes, with cavalry, guns, and transport, was reported at six o'clock. Marchiennes is almost midway between Valenciennes and Douai, to the west of the British line of retreat. This moving line of troops continued southward through Somain for a distance of about five miles, and then bent in a south-easterly direction, pointing straight at Le Cateau, until it reached Bouchain, where there were mounted and dismounted troops extending over three miles. But Le Cateau was not the objective of these troops. General von Kluck believed that the next stand of the British army, after Mons, would be made on a position running east and west through Bavai, and resting its right on the fortress of Maubeuge. The troops seen at Bouchain were intended to envelop it and take it in the rear. Meantime the British army, having escaped the lure of Maubeuge, was continuing its painful march southward on both sides of the Forest of Mormal; and the claw that was extended to catch it closed upon air. [Illustration: Map Illustrating Aerial Reconnaissance Area. 25th & 26th August 1914.] These movements of von Kluck's army on the 25th were influenced by his own air reports, which appear to have misled him. The army order issued by him from Soignies at 8.30 p.m. on the night of the 24th assumed that the British army would accept battle on the line Maubeuge-Bavai-Valenciennes. Von Kluck was very hopeful. 'The outflanking of the left of the British Army,' he says, 'on the assumption that it remained in position, appeared to be guaranteed.' An important air report which reached him at 1.0 a.m. on the 25th led him to suspect that the British were withdrawing on Maubeuge. Speaking of this report, he says: 'Enemy columns of all arms were in retreat on the roads Bellignies-Bavai, La Flamengrie-Bavai, and Gommegnies-Bavai. The direction in which the movement was being made beyond Bavai had not yet been determined; nevertheless, the army commander began to suspect that the British were withdrawing on Maubeuge.' He sent out orders in great haste by motor-car for the army to advance in a more southerly direction. At 9.0 a.m. however, a new air report came as a surprise. Long British columns of all arms were moving from Bavai along the Roman road to Le Cateau, and numerous small columns, single companies, batteries, squadrons, and cars were crossing the Selle, north and south of Solesmes. 'The enemy was marching in an almost opposite direction to what was supposed earlier in the morning.' A fresh order was at once sent out to attack the British and bring them to a standstill.