The “army” was, in reality, not much more than an unorganized body of densely ignorant natives who, as practically the only compensation for their supposed loyalty, were allowed to carry guns, which they did not know how to use. I taught them how to march without getting in each other’s way, how to handle their arms without shooting themselves, and as much discipline as they were amenable to, but I fear my efforts did not go much beyond that even though they did effect a decided improvement. One of my first recommendations to the President was that he buy and fit out two small gunboats with which to patrol the coast and hold in check such revolutionary centres as Monte Cristi, under threat of bombardment. They could also be used, as I pointed out, to transport troops quickly to rebelliously inclined districts. The President thought well of the plan and, though I advised steamers, he directed that the “Juliette,” for which he agreed to pay a fair price, be converted into such a craft. I ordered five small rapid-fire guns sent from England to Halifax, Nova Scotia, and, the revolutionary spirit seemingly having subsided with the improvement in the army, took the “Juliette” there in the Summer of 1873, to have her decks strengthened and mount the cannon. We returned early in the Fall to find that the smouldering revolution had burst into a flame and a large force was marching on Santo Domingo City, and only a few miles away. When I reached the palace the President and his brother were vehemently but vainly advising each other to be brave. “What shall we do--what shall we do?” demanded the President as I entered the door. “It strikes me that it might be a good scheme to fight,” I replied, with no attempt to conceal my disgust at their attitude. “In fact, I should say it is up to us to fight, and fight until we are all bloody, if we have to.” “Yes, yes, but where?” queried the trembling chief executive. “Go out and meet them,” I advised. “They probably will not be looking for us, as I judge that would be a departure from the established Santo Domingan method of warfare, and we may be able to take them at a disadvantage.” “No, no,” urged the panic-stricken Minister of War, “let us wait until they get into the city and then bombard them with your guns.” “Which would mean,” I said, “killing four or five of your own people to every one of the enemy. I am not used to that way of fighting and don’t know how to do it.”