Familiar precedents and principles were believed to sanction the movement of our troops. In 1794 Washington had ordered Wayne to conduct hostilities in disputed territory, and had threatened to destroy a British fort there. In accordance with a resolution of Congress, Madison had seized the "Florida parishes" claimed by Spain. Just before Taylor was ordered to move, Hilliard informed the House of Representatives that England had magistrates in the southern part of Oregon; and John Quincy Adams proposed to take military possession of that disputed territory before concluding negotiations. If such a method could be employed in dealing with countries willing to treat, very naturally--in the case of one that had pronounced for war--pacific occupation, leaving the competing jurisdiction undisturbed, seemed fully justifiable.[7.29] Taylor's advance appeared also to be highly expedient. For one thing, our claim upon the intermediate region would have been weakened, had we refrained from sharing with Mexico in the occupation of it. For another, it seemed wise to place ourselves in a strategic position that would be of great value, should Mexico's threat of war be carried into effect. And for a third it was believed that a bold military attitude, indicating that at last the United States had made up its mind, would count with Mexico as a strong argument for negotiation. Such was the opinion of Parrott, Slidell, Worth, Taylor, Scott, Archer, now chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, Brantz Mayer, formerly secretary of legation at Mexico, Polk himself, the administration circle in general, and well-informed persons outside it. January 17 Conner was ordered to assemble all his vessels and exhibit them off Vera Cruz--evidently in pursuance of this design. The government organ stated, and opposition writers conceded, that such a purpose was in view.[7.30]