The War with Mexico, Volume 1 (of 2)Smith, Justin Harvey
History
The War with Mexico, Volume 1 (of 2)
Smith, Justin Harvey
Mexican War, 1846-1848
From the forced march of Ampudia and his troops one might infer that the
government had positively decided to make a stand at Monterey, but such
was by no means the fact. Before leaving Vera Cruz and again later Santa
Anna warned both Salas and the minister of war emphatically against
this idea, and on August 20 Ampudia was therefore notified that unless
Mejía's troops and the fortifications were certainly of sufficient
strength to check the enemy, he should "on no account risk an action."
Three days later the department informed him that the general-in-chief
was "convinced" that Monterey could not be defended, and that his
forces were "not strong enough to resist the Americans"; and in view of
this opinion he was directed to halt at Saltillo, and order Mejía by
special express to demolish his fortifications, and remove his army and
military effects to that city "without loss of time"--the purpose of the
government being "to gather an army capable of winning a victory without
risking the honor and great interests of the nation."[11.12]
The new commander at the north, however, was doubtless thinking for
himself. In view of Santa Anna's purpose to organize a grand army
under his personal orders, this was Ampudia's last opportunity to
shine independently, and he did not wish to lose it. On learning the
strength of Mejía's and Taylor's armies and the condition of the
fortifications, he believed he could not only repulse the Americans but
drive them beyond the Rio Grande. Mejía took the ground that it would
be dishonorable to give up Monterey and the pass between that city and
Saltillo without a fight, and that it might be very hard to recover the
road through the mountains after giving the Americans an opportunity
to fortify it. His officers, who met by Ampudia's order in a council
of war, appear to have shared this opinion; and the comandante general
of Nuevo León, "as a Mexican and an officer in the national army,"
protested "before God and men" against the instructions to retreat,
leaving twenty guns that could not be taken away, and permitting the
enemy to triumph "without hearing a shot from the Mexican arms." So the
die was cast; and on learning of Ampudia's decision, together with his
reasons, the war department endorsed it.[11.13]
[MONTEREY MADE READY FOR DEFENCE]
On reaching the ground, Ampudia proceeded to inspect Mejía's works. The
importance of erecting fortifications at Monterey had been clearly seen.
May 27 the minister of war gave orders accordingly, and Mejía promptly
sent an engineer there to reconnoitre and draw a plan. Since, however,
he could not afford to hire or even feed laborers, only soldiers carried
on the work, and little was accomplished before the end of July; but
people were then required to labor without pay, and the progress became
more rapid. Ampudia now brought men from the neighboring towns also;
and Monterey, excited by the news of Taylor's advance, became a hive of
industry.[11.14]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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