The War with Mexico, Volume 2 (of 2)Smith, Justin Harvey
History
The War with Mexico, Volume 2 (of 2)
Smith, Justin Harvey
Mexican War, 1846-1848
As soon as day broke, gloomy and wet, the shooting was in fact
resumed, at least in the northern quarters. But he soon perceived that
no general movement was taking place, and again marched away. This
disheartened the people still more; the efforts of the authorities
influenced them greatly; and by the end of the afternoon, realizing
that much was to be suffered and nothing gained, they generally
abandoned hope. During the next day or two scattering shots could be
heard, but real fighting was over. Extravagant hopes of destroying the
small American army were still entertained by lightheaded men. "You
will soon behold the banner of the haughty invader trailing in the
dust," wrote one of these, and attempts were made by military officers
to organize a real conspiracy; but lack of courage, means, confidence
and mutual trust--as well as the watchfulness of the Americans--made
success impossible. Scott repeatedly warned his troops to be vigilant
and orderly, to keep together, and to refrain from drinking. As the
danger grew less menacing, however, they became less careful, and for
probably a month assassinations were frequent. From first to last
several hundred Americans perished in the hostilities, and no doubt
far more of the enemy. But by the middle of October the city was
tranquil.[29.2]
The concluding field operations in Scott's department resembled for the
most part the fighting just described, for they had to do chiefly with
guerillas. That style of warfare suited the national character. It had
figured prominently in the Spanish struggle against Napoleon and in the
Mexican war of independence; and when the public began to see clearly
that battles could not stop the Americans, it was invoked--even though
by universal military practice in Europe those who robbed and fought at
will, while pretending to be inoffensive, were considered brigands and
assassins--as the one hope.[29.3]
Thoughtful persons like J. F. Ramírez and General Mora pointed out
serious dangers: the impossibility of discipline, the relaxation of
morale, the destruction of all standards, and the certainty that a
spirit of violence and rapine would grow by what it fed upon; and they
recognized the improbability that such methods could prevail against
the strength, equipment, compactness and skill of the Americans. But
the obvious advantages of the guerilla system, which it required far
less intelligence to perceive and appreciate, counted powerfully on the
other side. How much the Spanish themselves had suffered from their
irregulars during the hostilities against Napoleon was not understood,
and patriotic pride in the war of independence had tended to draw a
veil over its horrors.[29.3]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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