The War With the United States : A Chronicle of 1812Wood, William
History
The War With the United States : A Chronicle of 1812
Wood, William
United States -- History -- War of 1812
The naval odds were not so favourable. But, as they could
be decisively affected by military action, they naturally
depended on Prevost, who, with his overwhelming army,
could turn them whichever way he chose. It was true that
Commodore Macdonough's American flotilla had more trained
seamen than Captain Downie's corresponding British force,
and that his crews and vessels possessed the further
advantage of having worked together for some time. Downie,
a brave and skilful young officer, had arrived to take
command of his flotilla at the upper end of Lake Champlain
only on September 2, that is, exactly a week before
Prevost urged him to attack, and nine days before the
battle actually did take place. He had a fair proportion
of trained seamen; but they consisted of scratch drafts
from different men-of-war, chosen in haste and hurried
to the front. Most of the men and officers were complete
strangers to one another; and they made such short-handed
crews that some soldiers had to be wheeled out of the
line of march and put on board at the very last minute.
There would have been grave difficulties with such a
flotilla under any circumstances. But Prevost had increased
them tenfold by giving no orders and making no preparations
while trying his hand at another abortive armistice--one,
moreover, which he had no authority even to propose.
Yet, in spite of all this, Prevost still had the means
of making Downie superior to Macdonough. Macdonough's
vessels were mostly armed with carronades, Downie's with
long guns. Carronades fired masses of small projectiles
with great effect at very short ranges. Long guns, on
the other hand, fired each a single large projectile up
to the farthest ranges known. In fact, it was almost as
if the Americans had been armed with shot-guns and the
British armed with rifles. Therefore the Americans had
an overwhelming advantage at close quarters, while the
British had a corresponding advantage at long range. Now,
Macdonough had anchored in an ideal position for close
action inside Plattsburg Bay. He required only a few men
to look after his ground tackle; [Footnote: Anchors and
cables.] and his springs [Footnote: Ropes to hold a vessel
in position when hauling or swinging in a harbour. Here,
ropes from the stern to the anchors on the landward side.]
were out on the landward side for 'winding ship,' that
is, for turning his vessels completely round, so as to
bring their fresh broadsides into action. There was no
sea-room for manoeuvring round him with any chance of
success; so the British would be at a great disadvantage
while standing in to the attack, first because they could
be raked end-on, next because they could only reply with
bow fire--the weakest of all--and, lastly, because their
best men would be engaged with the sails and anchors
while their ships were taking station.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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