It was past ten o'clock when these troops debouched in two Columns from the Fleurus Wood--the one along the High road, the other more to the right--and drew up in two lines within a short distance of Fleurus. In the First Line PAJOL's Light, and EXCELMANS' Heavy, Cavalry, formed the Right, and VANDAMME's Corps, the Left, Wing; while GÉRARD's Corps which had not received the Order to march until half past nine o'clock, arrived much later, and occupied the Centre. GIRARD's Division was detached some little distance on the extreme Left. The Imperial Guard and MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ constituted the Second Line. More than an hour was passed in this position before the arrival of the Emperor, who then rode along the line of Vedettes, and reconnoitred the Enemy's dispositions. It appeared to NAPOLEON that BLÜCHER had taken up a position perpendicular to the Namur road, and had, in this way, completely exposed his Right Flank; whence he inferred that the Prince placed great reliance upon the arrival of auxiliary forces from the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army. A single glance at the Prussian position, as it has been described, will suffice to prove that the French Emperor was in error as regarded BLÜCHER's assumed Line of Battle, and that so far from its having been perpendicular to, it was, in the general military acceptation of the term, parallel with, the Namur road. At the same time it is proper to remark, that he may have been misled by the massing of the Prussian troops between the salient point of the position, St Amand, and the road in question, as well as by the direction of the line of the occupied Villages of St Amand, Ligny, and Sombref. It must also be acknowledged that although the inference was incorrectly drawn, it accorded in substance with the real fact, that BLÜCHER did rely upon the arrival of a portion of WELLINGTON's forces by the Namur road from Quatre Bras. NAPOLEON having returned from his reconnaissance, immediately gave his Orders for the advance of the Army, and for the disposition of each individual Corps in his intended Line of Battle. Impressed with the important advantage which, according to his assumed view of BLÜCHER's position, might accrue from a vigorous and well timed attack upon the Right and Rear of the Prussians, while vigorously assailing them himself in their Front, he directed SOULT to address to NEY the despatch, dated two o'clock, to which reference was made in the preceding Chapter, acquainting the Marshal that in half an hour thence he proposed attacking BLÜCHER, posted between Sombref and Bry, and desiring that he would, on his part, also attack whatever might be in his front, and that after having vigorously repulsed the Enemy, he should move towards the Emperor's Field of Battle, and fall upon the Right and Rear of the Prussians; adding, at the same time, that should the Emperor be first successful, he would then move to the support of the Army at Quatre Bras.