But if such good grounds exist for inferring that, on the 17th, an earlier and a clearer insight into the Enemy's movements might have been obtained by the Corps detached in pursuit of the Prussians, and that when obtained, it would have rendered the communication with the operations of the main Army on the left of the Dyle, a matter not only important in the highest degree, but also perfectly practicable; and if a failure in this respect be attributable to the absence of sufficient energy and vigour on the part of GROUCHY, how much more forcibly does it not expose the extraordinary, the unaccountable, dilatoriness of NAPOLEON himself during the whole of the precious morning of the 17th! How striking a view it unfolds of what might have been accomplished, had the bivouac at Ligny been broken up a few hours earlier! Then, WELLINGTON's Army was still between Quatre Bras and the narrow Defile of Genappe, open to an attack in front by NEY, simultaneously with one in flank by the force collected at Marbais (a part of which might have been detached across the Genappe, towards the rear of the Anglo-Allied Army, by Villers la Ville and Bousseval, masked by the Wood of Berme); and the rearmost Corps of the Prussian Army (THIELEMANN's), which was retreating through Gembloux, might have been attacked with effect, by the superior force of all Arms under GROUCHY. As regards GROUCHY's movements during the early part of the 18th, it is very remarkable, that although he had in his despatch, written at ten o'clock the previous night, communicated to NAPOLEON his surmises of an intended junction of a portion of BLÜCHER's forces with those of WELLINGTON, and his consequent intention of following the Prussians in the direction of Wavre, _afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles, et de les séparer de WELLINGTON_, and although he must or ought to have been aware that Wavre was only twelve miles distant from NAPOLEON's main line of operations, whereas Gembloux was about fifteen miles distant from Wavre, he not only delayed his departure from Gembloux until between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, but manoeuvred by his right; taking the more circuitous line, through Sart à Wallain, and rendering his operations still more dilatory by moving both VANDAMME's and GERARD's Corps along one and the same road. Had he not, from want of sufficient vigilance, continued ignorant of the fact, that the principal Prussian Column, consisting of the First and Second Corps, had retired upon Wavre, at so short a distance from his left as by the line of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont St Guibert, there can be very little doubt that he would have marched upon the latter point, which the Prussians, aware of its importance, had occupied with a Rear Guard; but even with the amount of information which he possessed, and with the inference justly impressed upon his mind that a co-operation between BLÜCHER and WELLINGTON was projected, we are at a loss to account for