Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
This disposition of WELLINGTON's forces, so completely in accordance
with the general features of the ground which he had selected with
consummate judgment as the Field on which he was prepared to give
battle to his imperial rival in the great art of war, was admirably
calculated for either offensive or defensive measures. The opposite
line of Heights, which the Enemy would naturally crown with the main
Line of his forces, was fully within the effectual range of cannon
shot; and no hostile movement could be made against any part of the
position, that would remain undiscovered within the range of musketry.
The formation of the ground in rear of the ridge, along the brow of
which his Front Line was posted, was such as effectually to screen from
the Enemy's observation any movements of the Supports and Reserves,
preparatory to either a contemplated attack, or to the assembling of
the necessary means of resistance at any threatened point. In rear
of the main Front Line the ground was practicable for the movements
of all Arms, the country was perfectly open, and the two high roads
added still further to the facility of communication between the front
and rear. The occupation of the Posts of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte
presented important advantages in aid alike of offensive and defensive
operations.
The Right Flank was rendered secure, not only by the position of
CLINTON's Division, commanding the valley skirting the Village of Merbe
Braine, but also by the occupation of the Town of Braine l'Alleud,
whence CHASSÉ's Division could co-operate so as to render any attempt
of the Enemy to turn that Flank a most hazardous experiment.
Although the Left of the main Front Line rested upon an open plain
or elevated plateau, and was therefore completely _en l'air_: yet
the Village of Smohain, the Farms of La Haye and Papelotte, together
with the scattered houses and numerous enclosures on the abrupt slope
descending into the valley in front, by being well garnished with
Infantry, offered the means of protracted resistance; while Cavalry was
at hand, on the high ground, to cover the latter if forced to retire,
and to frustrate the complete development of the Enemy's disposition
of attack. The latter description of force was also available in
maintaining a vigilant look out for any direct flank attack; which,
however, was the less to be apprehended in consequence of the
preconcerted Prussian co-operation in that quarter.
* * * * *
The position also afforded ample security for a retreat. The two
broad high roads uniting at a point in rear of the centre, greatly
facilitated the retirement of unbroken masses upon Mont St Jean; while
the Village itself, and the numerous buildings and inclosures which
lined the great road as far as the Forest of Soignies, presented the
ready means of securing the further retreat of those masses, which, it
may be assumed, would have constituted a main Central Column.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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