The additional impulse which this imposing spectacle was calculated to impart to the moral force of his troops, is also well worthy of consideration. His soldiers, as they contemplated the extended double Front Line of Infantry, disposed as if about to enfold the Enemy in a deadly embrace, and the fluttering of gay lance flags on either extremity, indicating that its Flanks were duly protected; as they glanced at the Second general Line, a double one of Cavalry, superbly mounted, and proudly mailed in glittering helmet and cuirass; and, as they scanned the well disposed Reserves and serried Centre; their reliance on their own strength and in the resources of their Leader was unbounded, their anticipations of success were heightened, and their eager longing for the contest was greatly augmented. And while adverting to the grand spectacle in a moral point of view, it would be well to consider whether it may not have also been designed to exert a powerful influence on that portion of the Anglo-Allied forces with which the Emperor was tampering, in the full expectation of seeing them again range themselves under his victorious Eagles: but which WELLINGTON, with judicious foresight and prompt address, broke up as a united body, and distributed among his British troops; thus securing himself against the possible enactment of a scene similar to that which so powerfully contributed to NAPOLEON's disaster on the plains of Leipzig. But supposing it to be admitted upon these grounds that the delay of the attack, having once been determined, was judiciously and advantageously employed, we ought also to consider whether the delay itself may not have been superinduced by motives of far higher import. Although the miry state of the ground has been put forward as the ostensible cause, can we for a moment imagine that NAPOLEON was the man to have allowed himself to be deterred by such an obstacle from commencing the attack at an earlier hour; had he, at the moment, been sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of things to foresee that the delay, together with the possibility of a lengthened contest, and of the approach of aid to the British General from the Prussian side, tended to render his situation one of extreme peril?