Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
successfully effected by the heads of the Columns, might have been
attained with infinitely greater ease and security by the masses which
followed. And even supposing that serious impediments stood in the way
of the full accomplishment of this concentration, such as the usual
delays occasioned by the lengthening out of the Columns of March, to
what did they amount in comparison with so many brilliant instances of
what had been overcome by the noble and heroic efforts of a French Army
headed by NAPOLEON? Had it even required some sacrifice, which at the
most could only have consisted in the temporary diminution of strength,
by the loss of stragglers on the march, what was this when placed in
the balance with the fulfilment of the grand design of NAPOLEON's
invasion of Belgium--preventing the junction of the Allied Armies, and
overthrowing them in detail?
The commencement of this design, in which the essential requisite was
rapidity of movement, had been eminently successful: a vantage ground
had been gained which offered the most encouraging prospect of success:
of BLÜCHER's four Corps, only one, ZIETEN's, had assembled in the
chosen position of Ligny, on the night of the 15th; PIRCH's, which had
arrived from Namur, was in bivouac between Onoz and Mazy, about six
miles from Ligny; THIELEMANN's Corps, which had quitted its cantonments
around Ciney at half past seven o'clock in the morning, passed the
night at Namur, about fifteen miles from Ligny; BÜLOW's Corps, supposed
by BLÜCHER to be then at Hannut, was still at Liege, about sixty miles
distant from Ligny. Between this position of Ligny and that occupied by
the leading Divisions of NAPOLEON's main Army, namely the villages of
Lambusart, Wagnée, and the Wood of Fleurus, there was an interval of
not more than from two to three miles! Hence every thing was favourable
to the French Emperor's plan, which only required to be carried on with
the same vigour and activity that had marked its commencement; the fate
of NAPOLEON, of France, and of Europe, hung upon its issue; not an
hour, not a moment should have been suffered to pass unheeded; and had
the French Right been concentrated during the night in this position,
as also the Left under NEY, between Gosselies and Frasne, and had an
impetuous attack, with overwhelming force, been made not later than
five o'clock on the following morning, upon both ZIETEN's and PIRCH's
Corps, not at that time united, it is very possible that these troops
would have been beaten in detail, that THIELEMANN's Corps, advancing
from Namur, would either have shared the same fate, or have moved off
in the direction of Hannut or Liege to effect a junction with BÜLOW,
whilst NEY would either have been enabled to secure the important point
of Quatre Bras before the arrival of any considerable portion of the
Anglo-Allied troops, or would have held his own force advantageously
disposed for a junction with that of NAPOLEON, on the latter moving to
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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