an elaborate battle-plan and a battle, or several battles, taxing to the utmost the endurance of troops dedicated to victory and resolute to death. So, ‘they brought us a long step forward towards the final victory of the Allied cause.’ We are to contract our range once more to the scope of the 49th Division, and to consider that ‘step’ more particularly in the region north of Albert by the Ancre, where Sir Hubert Gough commanded the Fifth Army. It was not a sensational record. If we follow the Diary of that Army, say, from July 21st to the end of September, we receive, mainly, an impression of containing work excellently done, while the shock of battle broke afar. A few of these entries may be cited: ‘July 21st. 49th Division in Leipsic Salient.... ‘July 23rd. Attack by 48th Division and 1st Australian Division. Good progress. 49th Division front South of River Ancre.... ‘July 29th. 49th Division left of 12th Division to River Ancre.... ‘Aug. 27th. 49th Division relieved 25th Division.... ‘Sept. 3rd. South of Ancre 49th Division attacked.... ‘Sept. 24th. 18th Division relieved 49th Division.... ‘Sept. 27th. 11th Division captured Stuff Redoubt. ‘Sept. 28th. 18th Division attacked Schwaben Redoubt.’ Except on September 3rd, to which we shall come back, the work of the 49th Division, seen from this angle of vision, appears more passive than active. Let us enlarge the angle considerably. Instead of Sir Hubert Gough’s, consult Major-General Perceval’s Diary, the Divisional instead of the Army Commander’s. We come nearer to action in that aspect. Between July 21st and the 27th there were ‘three encounters with the enemy in the Leipsic Salient.’ On the 21st, he made a bombing attack; on the 22nd, the 4th York and Lancasters ‘attempted to extend our position in the Salient to the east by surprise,’ but were foiled; on the 23rd, the 4th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry made a similar attempt, ‘but consolidation was prevented by a heavy counter-attack from all sides, and our troops retired to their original line.’ From the Army Commander’s point of view, a single entry sufficed for these exploits; the Divisional Commander had to account for nearly five hundred casualties in the period.