| | | | BULLECOURT | | |58th (London) |London, 2nd Line, T.F. | | | | | | |62nd (W. Riding)|W. Yorks. (4 Bns.) | | | |D. of Wellington’s | | | | (4 Bns.). | | | |K.O.Y.L.I. (2 Bns.). | | | |York. & Lancs. (2 Bns.). | | | | LAGNICOURT | |Australian| | ------------+-----+----------+----------------+------------------------- It was a strong force, as is apparent, and except in the extreme southern sector, from Ecoust (opposite Bullecourt) to Lagnicourt, no 2nd Line Territorial troops were engaged. There, with Londoners on their left and Australians on their right, twelve battalions from the West Riding took their part. The operation was not successful. ‘The attacking troops of the Fifth Army,’ wrote Sir Douglas Haig, ‘were obliged to withdraw to their original line.[76]’ Thus they missed the more sensational advances which were secured at Vimy and Monchy-le-Preux. But they contributed by their action to those results, and their gallantry earned a high encomium from the British Commander-in-Chief, and established for the 62nd Division, in its first engagement on a big scale, a record worthy of more veteran troops. Let us start in this sector on April 9th, the day of the opening of the Battle of Arras. It was explained to the Front-line Battalions that, in the event of the attack of the Third Army on Neuville Vitasse being successful, and of the advance being pushed forward to Fontaine-les-Croisilles and Cherisy, the enemy might evacuate his positions. Patrols were sent out, accordingly, in order to ascertain the facts; and the 2/6th West Yorkshires, for example, if we may select one Battalion out of the twelve, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to advance after 12 o’clock noon at one hour’s notice. A provisional scheme of operations was laid down, in anticipation of the sequence of events, should the Hindenburg Line be evacuated on that part. These plans missed fire, however, and on the next day (10th) the unit which we have selected was still stationed at St. Leger. In the early morning information arrived of an impending German counter attack, and, after orders had been issued for a move at ten minutes’ notice, Brigade Orders arrived during the afternoon for a night march to Ecoust. This move was duly accomplished. The object was to capture Bullecourt and Hendecourt, and then to move forward in the general direction of Cagnicourt, on the further side of the Quéant switch. Shortly after midnight on April 11th, the troops were informed to this effect; Zero hour was 4-30 a.m.